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Abstract. Several generic constructions for transforming one-way functions to asymmetric en-
cryption schemes have been proposed. One-way functions only guarantee the weak secrecy of their
arguments. That is, given the image by a one-way function of a random value, an adversary has
only negligible probability to compute this random value. Encryption schemes must guarantee
a stronger secrecy notion. They must be at least resistant against indistinguishability-attacks
under chosen plaintext text (IND-CPA). Most practical constructions have been proved in the
random oracle model. Such computational proofs turn out to be complex and error prone. Bana
et al. have introduced Formal Indistinguishability Relations, (FIR for short) as an appropriate
abstraction of computational indistinguishability. In this paper, we revisit their work and extend
the notion of FIR to cope with the random oracle model on one hand and adaptive adversaries
on the other hand. Indeed, when dealing with hash functions in the random oracle model and
one-way functions, it is important to correctly abstract the notion of weak secrecy. Moreover, one
needs to extend frames to include adversaries in order to capture security notions as IND-CPA.
To fix these problems, we consider pairs of formal indistinguishability relations and formal non-
derivability relations. We provide a general framework along with general theorems, that ensure
soundness of our approach and then we use our new framework to verify several examples of
encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare Rogaway and Hashed ElGamal.
1 Introduction
Our day-to-day lives increasingly depend upon information and our ability to manipulate it
securely. That is, in a way that prevents malicious elements to subvert the available information
for their own benefits. This requires solutions based on provably correct cryptographic systems
(e.g., primitives and protocols). There are two main frameworks for analyzing cryptographic
systems; the symbolic framework, originating from the work of Dolev and Yao [15], and the
computational approach, growing out of the work of [17]. A significant amount of effort has been
made in order to link both approaches and profit from the advantages of each of them. Indeed,
while the symbolic approach is more amenable to automated proof methods, the computation
approach can be more realistic.
In their seminal paper [1] Abadi and Rogaway investigate the link between the symbolic
model on one hand and the computational model on the other hand. More precisely, they
introduce an equivalence relation on terms and prove that equivalent terms correspond to
indistinguishable distributions ensembles, when interpreted in the computational model. The
work of Abadi and Rogaway has been extended to active adversaries and various cryptographic
primitives in e.g. [20, 19, 14, 18]. An other line of work, also considering active adversaries is
followed by Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner using reactive simulatability [6, 5] and Canetti [12,
13] using universal composability.
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Related works A recently emerging branch of relating symbolic and computational models for
passive adversaries is based on static equivalence from π-calculus [3], induced by an equational
theory. Equational theories provide a framework to specify algebraic properties of the under-
lying signature, and hence, symbolic computations in a similar way as for abstract data types.
That is, for a fixed equational theory, a term describes a computation in the symbolic model.
Thus, an adversary can distinguish two terms, if he is able to come up with two computations
that yield the same result when applied to one term but different results when applied to the
other term. Such a pair of terms is called a test. This idea can be extended to frames, which
roughly speaking are tuples of terms. Thus, a static equivalence relation is fully determined
by the underlying equational theory, as two frames are statically equivalent, if there is no test
that separates them. In [9] Baudet, Cortier and Kremer study soundness and faithfulness of
static equivalence for general equational theories and use their framework to prove soundness
of exclusive or as well as certain symmetric encryptions. Abadi et al. [2] use static equivalence
to analyze of guessing attacks.
Bana, Mohassel and Stegers [8] argue that even though static equivalence works well to
obtain soundness results for the equational theories mentioned above, it does not work well in
other important cases. Consider for instance the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption (DDH
for short) that states that the tuples (g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc), where a, b, c are randomly
sampled, are indistinguishable. It does not seem to be obvious to come up with an equational
theory for group exponentiation such that the induced static equivalence includes this pair of
tuples without including others whose computational indistinguishability is not proved to be a
consequence of the DDH assumption. The static equivalence induced by the equational theory
for group exponentiation proposed in [9] includes the pair (g, ga, gb, ga
2b) and (g, ga, gb, gc). It
is unknown whether the computational indistinguishability of these two distributions can be
proved under the DDH assumption. Therefore, Bana et al. propose an alternative approach to
build symbolic indistinguishability relations and introduce formal indistinguishability relations
(FIR). A FIR is defined as a closure of an initial set of equivalent frames with respect to
simple operations which correspond to steps in proofs by reduction. This leads to a flexible
symbolic equivalence relation. FIR has nice properties. In order to prove soundness of a FIR
it is enough to prove soundness of the initial set of equivalences. Moreover, static equivalence
is one instance of a FIR. Bana et al. show that it is possible to come up with a FIR whose
soundness is equivalent to the DDH assumption.
Contributions. In this paper, we extend Bana et al.’s approach by introducing a notion of
symbolic equivalence that allows us to prove security of encryption schemes symbolically. More
specifically, we would like to be able to treat generic encryption schemes that transform one-
way functions to IND-CPA secure encryption schemes. Therefore, three problems need to be
solved. First, we need to cope with one-way functions. This is another example where static
equivalence does not seem to be appropriate. Indeed, let f be a one-way function, that is, a
function that is easy to compute but difficult to invert. It does not seem easy to come with a set
of equations that capture the one-wayness of such a function. Consider the term f(a|b), where
| is bit-string concatenation. If f is a one-way function then we know that we cannot easily
compute a|b given f(a|b) for uniformly sampled a and b. However, nothing prevents us from
being able to compute a for instance. Introducing equations that allow us to compute a from
f(a|b), e.g., g(f(a|b)) = a, may exclude some one-way functions and does not solve the problem.
For instance, nothing prevents us from computing a prefix of b (its first half for instance), a
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prefix of the prefix, etc..... . The second problem that needs to be solved is related to the
fact that almost all practical provably secure encryption schemes are analyzed in the random
oracle model. The random oracle model is an idealized model in which hash functions are
randomly sampled functions. In this model, adversaries have oracle access to these functions.
An important property is that if an adversary is unable to compute the value of an expression a
and if H(a) has not been leaked then H(a) looks like a uniformly sampled value. Thus, we need
to be able to symbolically prove that a value of a given expression a cannot be computed by
any adversary. This is sometimes called weak secrecy in contrast to indistinguishability based
secrecy. To cope with this problem, our notion of symbolic indistinguishability comes along
with a non-derivability symbolic relation. Thus in our approach, we start from an initial pair of
a non-derivability relation and a frame equivalence relation. Then, we provide rules that define
a closure of this pair of relations in the spirit of Bana et al.’s work. Also in our case, soundness
of the obtained relations can be checked by checking soundness of the initial relations. The third
problem is related to the fact that security notions for encryption schemes such IND-CPA and
real-or-random indistinguishability of cipher-text under chosen plaintext involve a generated
from of active adversaries. Indeed, these security definitions correspond to two-phase games,
where the adversary first computes a value, then a challenge is produced, the the adversary
tries to solve the challenge. Static equivalence and FIR (as defined in [8]) consider only passive
adversaries. To solve this problem we consider frames that include variables that correspond
to adversaries. As frames are finite terms, we only have finitely many such variables. This is
the reason why we only have a degenerate form of active adversaries which is enough to treat
security of encryption schemes and digital signature, for instance.
The closure rules we propose in our framework are designed with the objective of minimizing
the initial relations which depend on the underlying cryptographic primitives and assumptions.
We illustrate the framework by considering security proofs of the construction of Bellare
and Rogaway [11] and Hash El Gamal [7].
Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the symbolic model used for describing generic
asymmetric encryption schemes. In Section 3, we describe the computational framework and
give definitions that relate the two models. In Section 4, we introduce our definition of formal
indistinguishability relation and formal non-derivability relation. We also present our method
for proving IND-CPA security. In Section 5, we illustrate our framework: we prove the con-
struction of Bellare and Rogaway [11] and Hash El Gamal [7], and we give a sketch of the proof
of encryption scheme proposed by Pointcheval in [23]. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude.
2 Symbolic semantics
2.1 Terms and subsitutions
A signature Σ = (S,F ,H) consists of a countably infinite set of sorts S = {s, s1, ...}, a finite
set of function symbols, F = {f, f1, ...}, and a finite set of oracle symbols, H = {g, h, h1, ...}
together with arities of the form ar(f) or ar(h) = s1 × ... × sk → s, k ≥ 0. Symbols in F
that take k = 0 as arguments are called constants. We suppose that there are three pairwise
disjoint sets N , X and P. N is the set of names, X is the set of first-order variables, and P is
the set of second order variables. We assume that both names and variables are sorted, that
is, to each name or variable u, a sort s is assigned; we use s(s) for the sot of u. Variables p ∈ P
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have arities ar(p) = s1× ...× sk → s. We suppose that there are a countable number of names,
variables and p-variables for each sort or arity.
A renaming is a bijection τ : N → N such that s(a) = s(τ(a)). As usual, we extend the
notation s(T ) to denote the sort of a term T . Terms of sort s are defined by the grammar:
T ::= term of sort s
|x variable x of sort s
|p(T1, . . . , Tk) variable p of arity s(T1)× ...× s(Tk)→ s
|n name n of sort s
|f(T1, . . . , Tk) application of symbol f ∈ F with arity s(T1)× ...× s(Tk)→ s
|h(T1, . . . , Tk) call of hash-function h ∈ H with arity s(T1)× ...× s(Tk)→ s
We use fn(T ), pvar(T ) and var(T ) for the set of free names, the set of p-variables and the
set of variables that occur in the term T , respectively. We use meta-variables u, v, w to range
over names and variables. We use st(T ) for the set of sub-terms of T , defined in the usual way:
st(u)
def
= {u} if u is a name or a variable, and st(l(T1, . . . , Tk))
def
= {l(T1, . . . , Tk)}
⋃
i∈{1,...k} st(Ti),
if l ∈ F ∪ H ∪ P. A term T is closed if and only if it does not have any free variables (but
it may contain p-variables, names and constant symbols), that means var(T ) = ∅. The set of
terms is denoted by T.
Symbols in F are intended to model cryptographic primitives, symbols in H are intended to
model cryptographic oracles (in particular, hash functions in the ROM model), whereas names
in N are used to model secrets, that is, concretely random numbers. Variables p ∈ P are
intended to model queries and challenges made by adversaries (they can depend on previous
queries).
Definition 1 (Substitution). A substitution σ is a mapping from variables to terms whose
domain is finite and such that σ(x) 6= x, for each x in the domain. A substitution σ is written
σ = {x1 = T1, ..., xn = Tn}, where dom(σ) = {x1, ..., xn} is its domain.
We only consider well-sorted substitutions for which xi and Ti have the same sort, var(Ti) ⊆
{x1, . . . , xn} and there is no circular dependence xi1 = Ti1(. . . xi2 . . .), xi2 = Ti2(. . . xi3 . . .), . . . xik =
Tik(. . . xi1 . . .). A substitution is called closed if all terms Ti are closed. We let var(σ) =
∪ivar(Ti), pvar(σ) = ∪ipvar(Ti), n(σ) = ∪ifn(Ti), and extend the notations pvar(.), var(.),
n(.) and st(.) to tuples and set of terms and substitutions in the obvious way. The application
of a substitution σ to a term T is written as σ(T ) = Tσ. Let σ = {x1 = T1, ..., xn = Tn} and
σ′ = {x′1 = T
′
1, ..., x
′
m = T
′
m} be substitutions such that dom(σ) ∩ dom(σ
′) = ∅. Then, σ|σ′
denotes the sunbstitution {x1 = T1, ..., xn = Tn, x
′
1 = T
′
1, ..., x
′
m = T
′
m}.
The abstract semantics of symbols is described by an equational theory E, that is an
equivalence (denoted as =E) which is stable with respect to application of contexts and well-
sorted substitutions of variables. We further require that E is stable under renamings.
Definition 2 (Equational Theory.). An equational theory for a given signature is an equiv-
alence relation E ⊆ T × T (written as =E in infix notation) on the set of terms such that
1. T1 =E T2 implies T1σ =E T2σ for every substitution σ;
2. T1 =E T2 implies T{x = T1} =E T{x = T2} for every term T and every variable x;
3. T1 =E T2 implies τ(T1) =E τ(T2) for every renaming τ .
All definitions from now on are given in the context of an (implicit) equational theory E.
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Exemples. For instance, symmetric and deterministic encryption can be modeled by the the-
ory Eenc generated by the classical equation Eenc = {dec(enc(x, y), y) =Eenc x}. A trap-
door one-way function can be modeled by the theory Eow generated by the equation Eow =
{f−1(f(x, pub(sk)), sk) =E x, }, where sk is the secret key (the trapdoor), f
−1 is the inverse
function of the trapdoor one-way function f , and pub(sk) is the public information, respectively.
2.2 Frames
Frames ([4]) represent sequences of messages (or pieces of information) observed by an adver-
sary. Formally:
Definition 3 (Frame). A frame is an expression of the form φ = νn˜.σ where σ is a well-
sorted substitution, and n˜ is n(σ), the set of all names occuring in σ. By abus of notation we
also use n(φ) for n˜, the set of names bounded in the frame φ.
The novelty of our definition of frames consists in permitting adversaries to interact with frames
using p-variables. This is necessary to be able to cope with adaptive adversaries. We note the
set of frames by F.
Next, we define composition and parallel composition of frames. Let φ = νn˜.{x1 = T1, ..., xn =
Tn} and φ
′ = νn˜′.σ be frames with n˜ ∩ n˜′ = ∅. Then, φφ′ denotes the frame ν(n˜ ∪ n˜′).{x1 =
T1σ, ..., xn = Tnσ}. Let now φ1 = νn˜1.σ1, ..., φk = νn˜k.σk be frames with pairwisely disjoint
domains and pairwisely disjoint bounded names n˜i. Their parallel composition, {φ1|φ2|...|φn}
is the frame ν(
⋃k
i=1 n˜i).σ1| · · · |σk. The iteration of a frame φ is the iterative composition of φ
with itself until it remains unchanged : φ∗ = (. . . ((φ)φ) . . .)φ.
Definition 4 (Static equivalence). Let φ and φ′ be two frames such that φ∗ = νn˜.σ and
φ′∗ = νn˜.σ′ with σ = {x1 = T1, ..., xn = Tn} and σ
′ = {x1 = T
′
1, ..., xn = T
′
n}. Given the
equational theory E, we say that φ and φ′ are statically equivalent written φ =E φ
′, if and only
if Tiσ =E T
′
iσ
′ for all i.
Some obvious properties: φ =E φ
′ implies ψφ =E ψφ
′ and τ(φ) =E τ(φ
′) for any frames φ,
φ′ and ψ and any renaming τ .
3 Computational Semantics
3.1 Distributions and indistinguishability
Let us note η ∈ N the security parameter. We are interested in analyzing generic schemes for
asymmetric encryption assuming ideal hash functions. That is, we are working in the random
oracle model [16, 11]. Using standard notations, we write h
r
← Ω to denote that h is randomly
chosen from the set of functions with appropriate domain (deppendong on η). By abuse of
notation, for a list H = h1, · · · , hm of hash functions, we write H
r
← Ω instead of the sequence
h1
r
← Ω, . . . , hm
r
← Ω. We fix a finite set H = {h1, . . . , hn} of hash functions. We assume an
arbitrary but fixed ordering on H; just to be able to switch between set-based and vector-based
notation. A distribution ensemble is a countable sequence of distributions {Xη}η∈N. We only
consider distribution ensembles that can be constructed in polynomial time by probabilistic
algorithms that have oracle access to O = H. Given two distribution ensembles X = {Xη}η∈N
5
and X ′ = {X ′η}η∈N, an algorithm A and η ∈ N, we define the advantage of A in distinguishing
Xη and X
′
η as the following quantity:
Adv(A, η,X,X ′) = Pr[x
r
← Xη : A
O(η, x) = 1]− Pr[x
r
← X ′η : A
O(η, x) = 1].
Then, two distribution ensembles X and X ′ are called indistinguishable (denoted by X ∼
X ′) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage Adv(A, η,X,X ′) is
negligible as a function of η, that is, for any n > 0, it become eventually smaller than η−n as η
tends to infinity. We insist that all security notions we are going to use are in the ROM, where
all algorithms, including adversaries, are equipped with oracle access to the hash functions.
3.2 Frames as distributions
We now give terms and frames a computational semantics parameterized by a computable
implementation of the primitives in the random oracle model. Provided a set of sorts S and a
set of symbols F , a computational algebra A = (S,F) consists of
– a sequence of non-empty finite set of bit strings [[s]]A = {[[s]]A,η}η∈N with [[s]]A,η ⊆ {0, 1}
∗
for each sort s ∈ S. For simplicity of the presentation, we assume that all sorts are large
domains, whose cardinalities are exponential in the security parameter η;
– a sequence of polynomial time computable functions [[f ]]A = {[[f ]]A,η}η∈N with [[f ]]A,η :
[[s1]]A,η × ...× [[sk]]A,η → [[s]]A,η for each f ∈ F with ar(f) = s1 × ...× sk → s;
– a polynomial time computable congruence =A,η,s for each sort s, in order to check the
equality of elements in [[s]]A,η (the same element may be represented by different bit strings).
By congruence, we mean a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation such that e1 =A,s1,η
e′1, ..., ek =A,sk,η e
′
k ⇒ [[f ]]A,η(e1, ..., ek) =A,s,η [[f ]]A,η(e
′
1, ..., e
′
k) ( we usually omit s,η and A
and write = for =A,s,η);
– a polynomial time procedure to draw random elements from [[s]]A,η; we denote such a
drawing by x ←R [[s]]A,η; for simplicity, in this paper we suppose that all these drawing
follow a uniform distribution.
From now on we assume a fixed computational algebra (S,F), and a fixed η, and for
simplicity we omit the indices A,s and η.
Given H a fixed set of hash functions, and (Ai)i∈I a fixed set of polynomial-probabilistc
functions (can be seen as a polynomial-probabilistc adversary AO that takes an additional
input i), we associate to each frame φ = νn˜.{x1 = T1, . . . , xk = Tk} a sequence of distributions
[[φ]]H,A computed as follows:
– for each name n of sort s appearing in n˜, draw a value nˆ
r
← [[s]];
– for each variable xi(1 ≤ i ≤ k) of sort si, compute Tˆi ∈ [[si]] recursively on the structure of
terms: xˆi = Tˆi ;
– for each call hi(T
′
1, . . . , T
′
m) compute recursively on the structure of terms:
̂hi(T ′1, . . . , T
′
m) =
hi(Tˆ ′1, . . . , Tˆ
′
m);
– for each call f(T ′1, . . . , T
′
m) compute recursively on the structure of terms:
̂f(T ′1, . . . , T
′
m) =
[[f ]](Tˆ ′1, . . . , Tˆ
′
m);
– for each call pi(T
′
1, . . . , T
′
m) compute recursively on the structure of terms and draw a value
̂pi(T ′1, . . . , T
′
m)
r
← AO(i, Tˆ ′1, . . . , Tˆ
′
m);
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– return the value φˆ = {x1 = Tˆ1, . . . , xk = Tˆk}.
Such values φ = {x1 = bse1, . . . , xn = bsen} with bsei ∈ [[si]] are called concrete frames. We
extend the notation [[.]] to (sets of) closed terms in the obvious way. We also generalize the
notation to terms or frames with free variables and free names, by specifying the concrete
values for all of them: [[.]]{n1=bsn1,...nk=bsnk,x1=bse1,...,xl=bsel}.
Now the concrete semantics of a frame φ with respect to an adversary A, is given by the
following sequence of distributions (one for each implicit η):
[[φ]]A =
[
H
r
← Ω;O = H; φˆ
r
← [[φ]]H,A : φˆ
]
When pvar(φ) = ∅, the concrete semantics of φ does not depend on the adversary A and we
will use the notation [[φ]] (or [[φ]]H) instead of [[φ]]A (respectively [[φ]]H,A).
3.3 Soundness and Completeness
The computational model of a cryptographic scheme is closer to reality than its formal rep-
resentation by being a more detailed description. Therefore, the accuracy of a formal model
can be characterized based on how close it is to the computational model. For this reason,
we introduce the notions of soundness and completeness that relate relations in the symbolic
model with respect to similar relations in the computational model. Let E be an equivalence
theory and let R1 ⊆ T × T, R2 ⊆ F × T, and R3 ⊆ F × F be relations on closed frames, on
closed terms, and relations on closed frames and terms, respectively.
– Then R1 is =-sound iff for every closed terms T1, T2 of the same sort, (T1, T2) ∈ R1 implies
that Pr[eˆ1, eˆ2
r
← [[T1, T2]]A : eˆ1 6= eˆ2))] is negligible for any polynomial time adversary A.
– Then R1 is =-complete iff for every closed terms T1, T2 of the same sort, (T1, T2) 6∈ R1
implies that Pr[eˆ1, eˆ2
r
← [[T1, T2]]A : eˆ1 6= eˆ2))] is non-negligible for some polynomial time
adversary A.
– Then R2 is 6⊢-sound iff for every closed frame φ and term T , (φ, T ) ∈ R2 implies that
Pr[φˆ, eˆ
r
← [[φ, T ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A.
– Then R2 is 6⊢-complete iff for every closed frame φ and term T , (φ, T ) 6∈ R2 implies that
Pr[φˆ, eˆ
r
← [[φ, T ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] is non-negligible for some polynomial-time adversary A.
– Then R3 is ≈E-sound iff for every frames φ1, φ2 with the same domain, (φ1, φ2) ∈ R3
implies that ([[φ1]]A) ∼ ([[φ2]]A) for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A.
– Then R3 is ≈E-complete iff for every frames φ1, φ2 with the same domain, (φ1, φ2) 6∈ R3
implies that ([[φ1]]A) 6∼ ([[φ2]]A) for some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A.
4 Formal relations
One challenge of the paper is to propose appropriate symbolic relations that correctly abstract
computational properties as indistinguishability of two distributions or weak secrecy of some
random value (that is, the adversary has only negligible probability to compute it). In this
section we provide two symbolic relations (called formal indistinguishability relation and for-
mal non-derivability relation) that are sound abstractions for the two above computational
properties.
First we define well-formed relations and we recall a simplified definition of a formal indis-
tinguishability relation as proposed in [8].
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Definition 5 (Well-formed relations). A relation Sd ⊆ F × T is called well-formed if
fn(M) ⊆ n(φ) for any (φ,M) ∈ Sd, and a relation Si ⊆ F× F is well-formed if dom(φ1) =
dom(φ2) for any (φ1, φ2) ∈ Si.
Definition 6. [FIR [8]] A well-formed equivalence relation ∼=⊆ F × F is called a formal
indistinguishability relation (FIR for short) with respect to the equational theory =E, if
∼= is closed with respect to the following closure rules:
(GE1) If φ1 ∼= φ2 then φφ1 ∼= φφ2, for any frame φ such that var(φ) ⊆ dom(φi) and n(φ) ∩
n(φi) = ∅.
(GE2) φ ∼= φ′ for any frame φ′ such that φ′ =E φ.
(GE3) τ(φ) ∼= φ for any renaming τ .
This definition is a good starting point to capture indistinguishability in the following
sense: if we have a correct implementation of the abstract algebra (i.e. =E is =-sound) and we
were provided with some initial relation S (reflecting some computational assumption) which
is ≈-sound , then the closure of S using the above rules produces a larger relation which still
remains ≈-sound. But in order to use this definition for real cryptographic constructions , we
need to enrich it in several aspects. First, most of constructions which are proposed in the
literature, ([10], [27], [21], [23], [25], [11]) use bijective functions (XOR-function or trapdoor
permutation) as basic bricks. To deal with these constructions, we add the following closure
rule:
(GE4) If M,N are terms such that N [M/z] =E y, M [N/y] =E z and var(M) = {y} and
var(N) = {z}, then for any substitution σ such that r 6∈ (fn(σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) and
x 6∈ dom(σ) it holds νn˜.r.{σ, x =M [r/y])} ∼= νn˜.r.{σ, x = r}.
Second, cryptographic constructions use often hash functions. In ideal models, hash func-
tions are primitives that if applied to a weakly secret argument, produce a completely random
value (modeled by random functions [11] or by pseudo-random permutations [22]). And they
are quite frequent primitives in cryptography that only ensure weak secrecy. For instance one-
way functions only guarantee that an adversary that possesses the image by a one-way function
of a random value, has only a negligible probability to compute this value. The computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption states that if given the tuple g, ga, gb for some randomly-
chosen generator g and some random values a, b, it is computationally intractable to compute
the value ga∗b (equivalently ga∗b is a weakly secret value). This motivates us to introduce the
formal non-derivability relation as an abstraction of weak secrecy. Let us explain the basic
closure rules of this relation. Since we assume that all sorts will be implemented by large finite
sets of bit strings, it is clearly that
(GD1) νr.∅ 6|= r.
Next rule captures the fact that renaming does not change the concrete semantics of terms
or frames.
(GD2) If φ 6|=M then τ(φ) 6|= τ(M) for any renaming τ .
If the equational theory is preserved in the computational world, then equivalent terms or
frames are indistinguishable.
(GD3) If φ 6|=M then φ 6|= N for any term N =E M .
(GD4) If φ 6|=M then φ′ 6|=M for any frame φ′ =E φ.
If some bit string (concrete implementation of some symbolic term M) is weakly secret,
then all polynomially computation (abstracted by the symbolic frame φ′) does not change this.
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(GD5) If φ 6|= M then φ′φ 6|= M for any frame φ′ such that var(φ′) ⊆ dom(φ) and n(φ′) ∩
bn(φ) = ∅.
Next rule establishes a relationship between indistiguishability and secrecy: if two distri-
butions are indistinguishable, then they leak exactly the same information.
(GD6) If T,U are terms such that U [T/y] =E z and z ∈ var(T )\var(U) and (fn(T )∪fn(U))∩
n˜ = ∅, then for all substitutions σ1, σ2 such that x 6∈ dom(σi) and νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]} ∼=
νn˜.{σ2, x = T [N/z]} and νn˜.σ1 6|=M then νn˜.σ2 6|= N .
And now the rule that captures the power of hash functions in the Random Oracle Model:
the image by a random function of a weakly secret value is a completely random value.
(HE1) If νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )] 6|= T and r 6∈ n(σ), then νn˜.σ ∼= νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )].
The following definition formalizes the tight connection between FIR and FNDR.
Definition 7 (FNDR and FIR). A pair of well formed relations (6|=,∼=) is a pair of (formal
non-derivability relation, formal indistinguishability relation) with respect to the equa-
tional theory =E, if (6|=,∼=) is closed with respect to the rules (GD1), ..., (GD6),(GE1),...,(GE4),
(HE1) and ∼= is an equivalence.
The following theorem shows that if a pair of FIR and FNDR relations was generated by
the initial sets Sd ⊆ F × T and Si ⊆ F × F, then it is sufficient to check only soundness
of elements in Sd and Si to ensure that the closures 〈Sd〉6|= and 〈Si〉∼= are sound. We define
(D1, I1) ⊏ (D2, I2) if and only if D1 ⊆ D2 and I1 ⊆ I2. It is easy to see that ⊏ is an order.
Theorem 1. Let (Sd, Si) be a well-formed pair of relations. Then, it exists a unique smallest
(with respect to ⊏) pair denoted (〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=) of (FNDR, FIR) such that 〈Sd〉6|= ⊇ Sd and
〈Si〉∼= ⊇ Si. In addition, if =E is =-sound, Sd is 6⊢-sound and Si is ≈-sound, then also 〈Sd〉6|=
is 6⊢-sound and 〈Si〉∼= is ≈-sound.
5 Applications
We apply the framework of Section 4 in order to prove IND-CPA security of several generic
constructions for asymmetric encryptions. So we will consider pairs of relations (6|=,∼=) =
(〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=) generated by some initial sets (Sd, Si), in different equational theories. We as-
sume that all =E , Sd, Si that are considerd in this section satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1.
We emphasize the following fact: adding other equations than those considered does not break
the computational soundness of results proved in this section, as long as the computational
hypothesis encoded by Sd and Si still hold.
First we introduce a general abstract algebra, and then we will extend it to cover different
constructions. We consider three sorts Data, Data1, Data2, and the symbols || : Data1 ×
Data2 → Data, ⊕S : S × S → S, 0S : S, with S ∈ {Data,Data
1, Data2} and πj : Data →
Dataj , with j ∈ {1, 2}. For simplicity, we omit the indice S when using ⊕S or 0S . The
equational theory Eg is generated by:
(XEq1) x⊕ 0 =Eg x.
(XEq2) x⊕ x =Eg 0.
(XEq3) x⊕ y =Eg y ⊕ x.
(XEq4) x⊕ (y ⊕ z) =Eg (x⊕ y)⊕ z.
(PEq1) π1(x||y) =Eg x.
(PEq2) π2(x||y) =Eg y.
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|| is intended to model concatenation, ⊕ is the classical XOR and πj are the projections.
Next rules are consequences of the closure rules from Section 4.
(SyE) If φ1 ∼= φ2 then φ2 ∼= φ1.
(TrE) If φ1 ∼= φ2 and φ2 ∼= φ3 then φ1 ∼= φ3.
(XE1) If r 6∈ (fn(σ) ∪ fn(T )) then νn˜.r.{σ, x = r ⊕ T} ∼= νn˜.r.{σ, x = r}.
(CD1) If (φ 6|= T1 ∨ φ 6|= T2) then φ 6|= T1||T2.
(HD1) If νn˜.σ 6|= T and h(T ) 6∈ st(σ) then νn˜.{σ, x = h(T )} 6|= T .
(XD1) If νn˜.σ 6|= T and r 6∈ (n˜ ∪ fn(T )) then νn˜.r.{σ, x = r ⊕ T} 6|= T .
5.1 Trapdoor one-way functions in the symbolic model
We extend the above algebra in order to model trapdoor one-way functions. We add a sort
iData and new symbols f : Data × Data → iData ,f−1 : iData × Data → Data, pub :
Data → Data. f is a trapdoor permutation, with f−1 being the inverse function. We extend
the equational theory:
(OEq1) f−1(f(x, pub(y)), y) =Eg x.
To simplify the notations, we will use fk(•) instead of f(•, pub(k)). Now we want to capture
the one wayness of function f . Computationally, a one-way function only ensures the weakly
secrecy of a random argument r (as long as the key k is not disclosed to the adversary). Hence
we define Si = ∅ and Sd = {(νk.r.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(r)}, r)}.
The following frame encodes the encryption scheme proposed by Bellare and Rogaway
in [11]:
φbr(m) = νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕m, z = h(m||r)}
where m is the plaintext to be encrypted, f is a trapdoor one-way function, and g and h are
hash functions (hence oracles in the ROM model).
TrE
HE1
CD1
GD5
HD1
GD5
OD1
{σ2} 6|= r
{σ2, y = s
′} 6|= r
{σ2, y = g(r)} 6|= r
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = t} 6|= r
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = t} 6|= p(xk)||r
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = h(p(xk)||r)} ∼= {σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = t} (T1)
{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = h(p(xk)||r)} ∼= {xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = s, z = t}
Fig. 1. Proof of IND-CPA security of Bellare-Rogaway scheme.
GE1
TrE
GE1
HE1
GD5
OD1
{σ2} 6|= r
{σ2, y = s} 6|= r
{σ2, y = g(r)} ∼= {σ2, y = s}
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk)} ∼= {σ2, y = s⊕ p(xk)}
XE1
{σ2, y = s⊕ p(xk)} ∼= {σ2, y = s}
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk)} ∼= {σ2, y = s}
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = t} ∼= {σ2, y = s, z = t}
Fig. 2. Tree (T1) from Figure 1.
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Now we can see the necessity of p-variables in order to encode IND-CPA security of an
encryption scheme. Proving that it holds for any two messages m1 and m2
νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕m1, z = h(m1||r)} ∼=
νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕m2, z = h(m2||r)}
is not enough. We did not capture that the adversary is adaptive and she can choose her
challenges depending on the public key. Hence we must prove a more stronger equivalence,
namely that it holds for any terms p(xk) and p
′(xk)
νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕ p(xk), z = h(p(xk)||r)} ∼=
νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕ p
′(xk), z = h(p
′(xk)||r)}
The reader noticed that for asymmetric encryption, this suffices to ensure IND-CPA: possessing
the public key and having access to hash-oracles, suffices to encrypt any message, hence it is
not necessary to have an oracle to encrypt messages.
Actually, in our case it suffices to prove νk.r.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = g(r)⊕p(xk), z =
h(p(xk)||r)} ∼= νk.r.s.t.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r), y = s, z = t}. By transitivity, this implies:
for any two challenges that adversary chooses for p(xk), the distributions she gets are indistin-
guishable.
Before proceeding with the proof, we first state some rules that are consequences of the
definition of Sd and of the closure rules from Section 4.
(OD1) If f is a one-way function, then νk.r.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(r)} 6|= r.
(ODg1) If f is a one-way function and νn˜.νk.{xk = pub(k), x = T} ∼= νr.νk.{xk = pub(k), x =
r}, then νn˜.νk.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(T )} 6|= T .
The proof of IND-CPA security of Bellare-Rogaway scheme is presented in Figure 1. To
simplify the notations we suppose that all names in frames are restricted and we note σ2 ≡
xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r).
5.2 Partially one-way functions in the symbolic model
In this subsection, we show how we can deal with trapdoor partially one-way functions. This
extension is motivated by Pointcheval’s construction in [23]. In contrast to the previous subsec-
tion, we demand for function f a stronger property than one-wayness. Let Data1 be a new sort,
and let f : Data1×Data×Data→ iData be a function and let f
−1 : iData×Data→ Data1,
such that
(OEq1) f(f−1(x, y), z, pub(y)) =Eg x.
The function f is said partially one way, if for any given f(s, r, pub(k)), it is impossible to
compute in polynomial time a corresponding s without the trapdoor k. In order to deal with
the fact that f is now partially one-way, we define Si = ∅ and Sd = {(νk.r.s.{xk = pub(k), x =
fk(r, s)}, r)}.
The following frame encodes the encryption scheme proposed by Pointcheval in [23].
φpo(m) = νk.r.s.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, h(m||s)), y = g(r)⊕ (m||s)}
wherem is the plaintext to be encrypted, f is a trapdoor partially one-way function, and g and h
are hash functions. To prove IND-CPA security of this scheme, we can show in our framework
that νk.r.s.{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, h(p(xk)||s)), y = g(r) ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= νk.r.s1.s2.{xk =
pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1), y = s2}.
11
TrE
HE1
GD6
SyE
XE1
{σ2, x = r, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= {σ2, x = r, y = s2}
{σ2, y = s2, x = r} ∼= {σ2, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s), x = r}
GD5
ODp1
{σ2} 6|= r
{σ2, y = s2} 6|= r
{σ2, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} 6|= r
{σ2, y = g(r)⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= {σ2, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} (T2)
{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, h(p(xk)||s)), y = g(r)⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= {xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1), y = s2}
Fig. 3. Proof of IND-CPA security of Pointcheval scheme.
TrE
XE1
{σ2, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= {σ2, y = s2}
GE1
HE1
CD1
GD5
GD1
∅ 6|= s
{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1)} 6|= s
{xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1)} 6|= p(xk)||s
{σ2} ∼= {xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1)}
{σ2, y = s2} ∼= {xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1), y = s2}
{σ2, y = s2 ⊕ (p(xk)||s)} ∼= {xk = pub(k), xa = fk(r, s1), y = s2}
Fig. 4. Tree (T2) from Figure 3.
Before proceeding with the proof we first state the next rule that is a consequence of the
definition of Sd.
(ODp1) If f is an one-way function, then νk.r.s.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(r, s)} 6|= r.
The proof of IND-CPA security of Pointcheval scheme is presented in Figure 3. To sim-
plify notations we suppose that all names in frames are restricted and we note σ2 ≡ xk =
pub(k), xa = fk(r, h(p(xk)||s)).
5.3 Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption
In this subsection we prove indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks of a variant of
Hash-ElGamal encryption scheme ([26]) in the random oracle model under the CDH assump-
tion. The proof of the original scheme([7]) can be easily obtained from our proof and it can be
done entirely in our framework.
We will consider two sorts G and A, symbol functions exp : G × A → G, ∗ : A × A → A,
0A : A, 1A : A, 1G : G. To simplify the notation we writeM
N instead of exp(M,N). We extend
the equational theory Eg by the following equations:
(XEqe1) (xy)z =Eg x
y∗z.
(XEqe2) x1A =Eg x.
(XEqe3) x0A =Eg 1G.
To capture the Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption in the symbolic model we define
Si = ∅ and Sd = {(νg.r.s.{xg = g, x = g
s, y = gr}, gs∗r)}.
So we have the next rule that is a consequence of the definition of Sd.
(CDH) νg.r.s.{xg = g, x = g
s, y = gr} 6|= gs∗r.
The following frame encodes the Hash-ElGamal encryption scheme.
φhel(m) = νg.r.s.{xg = g, x = g
s, y = gr, z = h(gs∗r)⊕m}
where m is the plaintext to be encrypted, (g, gs) is the public key and h is a hash function.
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The proof of IND-CPA security of Hash-ElGamal’s scheme is provided in Figure 5. To
simplify the notations we suppose that all names are restricted and we note σe ≡ xg = g, x =
gs, y = gr.
TrE
GE1
HE1
GD5
CDH
{σe} 6|= g
s∗r
{σe, z = t} 6|= g
s∗r
{σe, z = h(g
s∗r)} ∼= {σe, z = t}
{σe, z = h(g
s∗r)⊕ p(x, xg)} ∼= {σe, z = t⊕ p(x, xg)}
XE1
{σe, z = t⊕ p(x, xg)} ∼= {σe, z = t}
{xg = g, x = g
s
, y = gr, z = h(gs∗r)⊕ p(x, xg)} ∼= {xg = g, x = g
s
, y = gr, z = t}
Fig. 5. Proof of IND-CPA security of Hash-ElGamal’s scheme
6 Static equivalence and FIR
In this section we adapt the definition of deductibility and static equivalence ([9]) to our
framework. After, we justify why they are too coarse to be appropriate abstractions for indis-
tinguishability and weak secrecy. We also prove that in general they are coarser approximations
of indistinguishability and weak secrecy than FIR and FNDR.
If φ is a frame, and M,N are terms, then we write (M =E N)φ for Mφ =E Nφ.
Definition 8 (Deductibility). A (closed) term T is deductible from a frame φ where
(pi)i∈I = pvar(φ), written φ ⊢ T , if and only if there exists a term M and a set of terms
(Mi)i∈I , such that var(M) ⊆ dom(φ),ar(Mi) = ar(pi), fn(M,Mi) ∩ n(φ) = ∅ and (M =E
T )(φ[(Mi(Ti1 , . . . , Tik)/pi(Ti1 , . . . , Tik))i∈I ]). We denote by 6⊢ the logical negation of ⊢.
For instance, we consider the equational theory Eg and the frame φ = νk1.k2.s1.s2.{x1 =
k1, x2 = k2, x3 = h((s1 ⊕ k1) ⊕ p(x1, x2)), x4 = h((s2 ⊕ k2) ⊕ p(x1, x2))}. Then h(s1) ⊕ k2 is
deductible from φ since h(s1)⊕k2 =Eg x3[x1/p(x1, x2)]⊕x2 but h(s1)⊕h(s2) is not deductible.
If we consider the frame φ′ = νk.r.s.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(r||s)} where f is a trapdoor
one-way function, then neither r||s, nor r is deductible from φ′. So, the one-wayness of f is
modelled by the impossibility of inverting f if k is not disclosed. While this is fair for r||s
according to the computational guarantees of f , it seems too strong of assuming that r alone
cannot be computed if f is “just” one-way. This raises some doubts about the fairness of 6⊢ as
a good abstraction of weak secrecy. We can try to correct this and add an equation of the form
g(f(x||z, pub(y)), y) =Eg x.
And now, what about r1, if one gives f((r1||r2)||s)? In the symbolic setting r1 is not deductible;
in the computational one we have no guarantee; hence, when one stops to add equations?
Moreover, in this way we could exclude ”good” one-way functions:
in the computational setting, if f is a one-way function, then f ′(x||y)
def
= x||f(y), is another
one-way function. The advantage of defining non-deductibility as we did it in the Section 4,
is that first, we capture “just” what is supposed to be true in the computational setting,
and second, if we add more equations to our abstract algebra (because we discovered that
the implementation satisfies more equations) in a coherent manner with respect to the initial
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computational assumptions, then our proofs still remain computationally sound. This is not
true for 6⊢.
Definition 9 (Test). A test for a frame φ is a triplet ((Mi)i∈I ,M,N) such that var(M,N) ⊆
dom(φ),ar(Mi) = ar(pi), fn(M,N,Mi) ∩ n(φ) = ∅. Then φ passes the test ((Mi)i∈I ,M,N)
if and only if (M =E N)(φ[(Mi(Ti1 , . . . , Tik)/pi(Ti1 , . . . , Tik))i∈I ]).
Definition 10 (Statically Equivalent). Two frames φ1 and φ2 are statically equivalent,
written as φ1 ≈E φ2, if and only if
(i) dom(σ1) = dom(σ2);
(ii) for any test ((Mi)i∈I ,M,N), φ1 passes the test ((Mi)i∈I ,M,N) if and only if φ2 passes
the test ((Mi)i∈I ,M,N).
For instance, the two frames φ1 = νk.s.{x1 = k, x2 = h(s) ⊕ (k ⊕ p(x1))} and φ2 =
νk.s.{x1 = k, x2 = s ⊕ (k ⊕ p(x1))} are statically equivalent with respect to Eg. However the
two frames φ′1 = νk.s.{x1 = k, x2 = h(s)⊕ (k⊕p(x1)), x3 = h(s)} and φ
′
2 = νk.s.{x1 = k, x2 =
s⊕ (k⊕p(x1)), x3 = h(s)} are not. The frame φ′2 passes the test ((x1), x2, x3), but φ
′
1 does not.
Let us now consider the equational theory from subsection 5.2. Then the following frames
νg.a.b.{x1 = g, x2 = g
a, x3 = g
b, x4 = g
a∗b) and νg.a.b.c.{x1 = g, x2 = g
a, x3 = g
b, x4 = g
c)
are statically equivalent. This seems right, it is the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. So,
a computational implementation that satisfies indistinguishability for the interpretations of
this two frames will simply satisfy the DDH assumption. But soundness would imply much
more. Even νg.a.b.{x1 = g, x2 = g
a, x3 = g
b, x4 = g
a2∗b2) and νg.a.b.c.{x1 = g, x2 = g
a, x3 =
gb, x4 = g
c) will be statically equivalent. It is unreasonable to assume that this is true for the
computational setting. And as for non-deductibility, the advantage of considering FIR as the
abstraction of indistinguishability, is that if we are adding equations in a coherent manner with
respect to the initial computational assumptions (that is with Si), then our proofs still remain
computationally sound.
Next proposition says that if the initial sets Sd and Si are reasonable, then the obtained
FIR and FNDR are finer approximations of indistinguishability and weak secrecy than 6⊢ and
≈E .
Proposition 1. Let (Sd, Si) be such that Sd ⊆6⊢ and Si ⊆≈E. Then 〈Sd〉6|= ⊆6⊢ and 〈Si〉∼= ⊆≈E.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a general framework for relating formal and computational models
for generic encryption schemes in the random oracle model. We proposed general definitions
of formal indistinguishability relation and formal non-derivability relation, that is symbolic
relations that are computationally sound by construction. We extended previous work with
respect to several aspects. First, our framework can cope with adaptive adversaries. This is
mandatory in order to prove IND-CPA security. Second, many general constructions use one-
way functions, and often they are analyzed in the random oracle model: hence the necessity
to capture the weak secrecy in the computational world. Third, the closure rules we propose
are designed with the objective of minimizing the initial relations which depend of the crypto-
graphic primitives and assumptions. We illustrated our framework on the generic encryption
scheme proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [11] and on Hash El Gamal [7].
As future works, we project to study the (relative) completeness of various equational
symbolic theories. Another ambitious extension will be to capture fully active adversaries.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let define (D1, I1) ∧ (D2, I2)
def
= (D1 ∩D2, I1 ∩ I2).
Let (Sd, Si) be some well-formed pair of relations. The existence of the unique smallest
(with respect to ⊏) pair (〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=) is implied by the fact that
1. (F×T,F× F) is a (FNDR,FIR) such that (Sd, Si) ⊏ (F×T,F× F);
2. if (D1, I1) and (D2, I2) are (FNDR,FIR), then (D1, I1) ∧ (D2, I2) is a (FNDR,FIR).
Hence, (〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=) can be defined as follows
(〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=)
def
=
∧{
(D, I)|(D, I) is a (FNDR,FIR) such that (Sd, Si) ⊏ (D, I)
}
.
Actually, it is easy to see easy that (〈Sd〉6|=, 〈Si〉∼=) is the least fixed point of some continuous
function F( 6|=,∼=) : (F×T)× (F×F) 7→ (F×T)× (F×F) defined following the rules (GD1), ...,
(GD6),(GE1),...,(GE4), (HE1), symmetry and transitivity. It can be constructed by applying
iteratively (〈Sd〉n, 〈Si〉n) = F
n
( 6|=,∼=)
((Sd, Si)), with n ∈ N until reaching a fixpoint.
Now we prove that 〈Sd〉6|= is 6⊢-sound and 〈Si〉∼= is ≈-sound, provided that =E is =-sound,
Sd is 6⊢-sound and Si is ≈-sound.
Most of the closure rules have premises that assume some hypothesis on 6|= or ∼=. Let
suppose that for any such closure rule (R), we prove its computational soundness, that is, the
following fact:
Fact A1 For any adversary A against the conclusion of the rule (R), there exists some ad-
versary B (or tuple of adversaries Bi) breaking one of the premises of (R) , and moreover:
1. the advantage of A is a polynomial w.r.t. to η and the advantage of B (advantages of Bi,
respectively) and
2. the adversary A has an execution time which is a polynomial w.r.t. to η and the execution
time of B (execution times of Bi, respectively).
Now let suppose that there is some element (e1, e2) in 〈Sd〉6|= or 〈Si〉∼= which is not 6⊢-sound
or ≈-sound. Let n be the number of steps needed to include (e1, e2) in 〈Sd〉6|= or 〈Si〉∼=, i.e. the
minimal number of iterations (〈Sd〉n, 〈Si〉n) needed to get (e1, e2) ∈ 〈Sd〉n or (e1, e2) ∈ 〈Si〉n.
Then, for any adversary A0 against the soundness of (e1, e2), we can construct an adversary
An against the soundness of an element (e01, e
0
2) of Sd or Si, such that
1. the advantage of A0 is bounded by an expression which depends of n and which is a
polynomial w.r.t. η and the advantage of An, and
2. the execution time of An is bounded by an expression which depends of n and which is a
polynomial w.r.t. η and the execution time of A0.
Since our reasoning is asymptotically (and n is independent from η), this would imply that
(e01, e
0
2) is not sound, contradiction with the 6⊢-soundness of Sd or the ≈-soundness of Si.
In what follows we prove soundness for all rules of section 4.
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(GD1) νr.∅ 6|= r.
Proof. To easy notations, we note S = [[s]]. Then we have
Pr[bs
r
← [[s]] : A() = bs] =
∑
bs∈S
Pr[bs′
r
← [[s]] : bs′ = bs] ∗ Pr[A() = bs]
=
∑
bs∈S
1
|S|
∗ Pr[A() = bs] =
1
|S|
∗
∑
bs∈S
Pr[A() = bs] =
1
|S|
Now we use the assumption that all sorts are suppposed to be of size exponential in η. ⊓⊔
(GD2) If φ 6|=M then τ(φ) 6|= τ(M) for any renaming τ .
Proof. Using the fact that renamings do not change distributions, we get [[τ(φ), τ(M)]] =
[[φ,M ]]. ⊓⊔
(GD3) If φ 6|=M then φ 6|= N for any term N =E M .
(GD4) If φ 6|=M then φ′ 6|=M for any frame φ′ =E φ.
Proof. Obviously, using the =-soundness of =E . ⊓⊔
(GD5) If φ 6|= M then φ′φ 6|= M for any frame φ′ such that var(φ′) ⊆ dom(φ) and n(φ′) ∩
bn(φ) = ∅.
Proof. Let φ′ such that var(φ′) ⊆ dom(φ) and n(φ′) ∩ bn(φ) = ∅. Let us suppose that φ 6|=M
is 6⊢-sound, and let us prove that φ′φ 6|= M is also 6⊢-sound. We have to show that for any
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A against φ′φ 6|= M , there exists an adversary B
against φ 6|=M that satisfies the conditions of Fact A1.
The adversary B uses A as a black box to first compute φˆ
r
← [[φ]]A; then it interprets all
variables in var(φ′) by bitstrings obtained in the previous stage (as var(φ′) ⊆ dom(φ)); it
continues to use A as a black box in order to interpret all queries from pvar(φ′); finally it gets
a concrete frame from [[φ′φ]]A and passes it to A; it answers as A. Hence, the advantage of B
equals the advantage of A, Adv(B, η, φ 66|= M) = Pr[φˆ, eˆ
r
← [[φ,M ]]B : B
O(φˆ) = eˆ] = Pr[φˆ′′, eˆ
r
←
[[φ′φ,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ′′) = eˆ] = Adv(A, η, φ′φ 66|=M).
In addition, the execution time of B is a polynomial w.r.t. to η and the execution time of
A, using that the size of encoding of φ′ is constant in η.
⊓⊔
(GD6) If T,U are terms such that U [T/y] =E z and z ∈ var(T )\var(U) and (fn(T )∪fn(U))∩
n˜ = ∅, then for all substitutions σ1, σ2 such that x 6∈ dom(σi) and νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]} ∼=
νn˜.{σ2, x = T [N/z]} and νn˜.σ1 6|=M then νn˜.σ2 6|= N .
Proof. Let us suppose that νn˜.σ1 6|= M is 6⊢-sound and νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]} ∼= νn˜.{σ2, x =
T [N/z]} is ≈-sound, and let us prove that νn˜.σ2 6|= N is also 6⊢-sound.
We have to show that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA against νn˜.σ2 6|= N ,
there exists adversaries B1 against νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]} ∼= νn˜.{σ2, x = T [N/z]}, and B2 against
νn˜.σ1 6|=M which satisfy the conditions of Fact A1.
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In our case we will provide an adversary B to play the role of B1 and we will use the
adversary A as player for the role of B2, too.
Since fn(T ) ∩ n˜ = ∅, it follows that T (z) is constructible using only dom(σi). Hence, the
adversary B uses A as a black box to first get either (φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]}]]A
or (φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.{σ2, x = T [N/z]}]]A. Then A stops and answers some string bs. If tˆ(eˆ) =
tˆ(bs), B answers 1 and stops. If tˆ(eˆ) 6= tˆ(bs), B picks randomly a bit c, answers c and stops.
From the definition of B, and using the =E injectivity of T and the =-soundness of =E , we
have the following:
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, x = T [N/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) = eˆ] = 1,
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ1, x = T [M/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) = eˆ] = 1,
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, x = T [N/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) 6= eˆ] = 12 + n2(η)
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ1, x = T [M/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) 6= eˆ] = 12 + n1(η)
where n1(η) and n2(η) are some negligible functions.
Now we have
Adv(B, η, νn˜.{σ1, x = T [M/z]}, νn˜.{σ2, x = T [N/z]}) =
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, x = T [N/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1]−
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ1, x = T [M/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 0] =
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, x = T [N/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) = eˆ] ∗ Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
←
[[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ]+
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, x = T [N/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) 6= eˆ] ∗ Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
←
[[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) 6= eˆ]−
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ1, x = T [M/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) = eˆ] ∗ Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
←
[[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ]−
Pr[(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ))
r
← [[νn˜.σ1, x = T [M/z]]]B : B
O(φˆ, x = tˆ(eˆ)) = 1|AO(φˆ) 6= eˆ] ∗ Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
←
[[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) 6= eˆ] =
Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ]+(12 +n2(η))∗Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) 6= eˆ]−
Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] − (12 + n1(η)) ∗ Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) 6=
eˆ] =
Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] + 12 ∗ (1− Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ])−
Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] − 12 ∗ (1 − Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) =
eˆ] + n3(η) =
1
2 ∗ (Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ2, N ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ] − Pr[(φˆ, eˆ)
r
← [[νn˜.σ1,M ]]A : A
O(φˆ) = eˆ])) +
n3(η) =
1
2 ∗ (Adv(A, η, νn˜.σ 6|= N)− Adv(A, η, νn˜.σ 6|=M))) + n3(η)
for some well-chosen negligible function n3(η).
Moreover, it is easy to see that the execution time of B is a polynomial w.r.t. to η and the
execution time of A, using that the test tˆ(eˆ)
?
= tˆ(bs), and picking uniformly a random bit can
be done in a time polynomial w.r.t. to η. ⊓⊔
(GE1) If φ1 ∼= φ2 then φφ1 ∼= φφ2, for any frame φ such that var(φ) ⊆ dom(φi) and n(φ) ∩
bn(φi) = φ.
Proof. Let φ such that var(φ) ⊆ dom(φi) and n(φ)∩ bn(φi) = φ. Let us suppose that φ1 ∼= φ2
is ≈-sound, and let us prove that φφ1 ∼= φφ2 is also ≈-sound. We have to show that for any
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary B, ([[φφ1]]B) ≈ ([[φφ2]]B).
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Let us suppose that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary B such that
([[φφ1]]B) 6≈ ([[φφ1]]B), that is Pr[φˆ′
r
← [[φφ1]]B : B
O(φˆ′) = 1]− Pr[φˆ′
r
← [[φφ2]]B : B
O(φˆ′) = 1]
is non-negligible.
Then we construct an adversary A such that Pr[φˆ
r
← [[φ1]]A : A
O(φˆ) = 1]− Pr[φˆ
r
← [[φ2]]A :
AO(φˆ) = 1] is non-negligible.
The adversary A uses B as a black box to first get φˆ
r
← [[φi]]B; then it interprets all variables
in var(φ) by bitstrings obtained in the previous stage (as var(φ) ⊆ dom(φi)); then it continues
to use B as a black box in order to interpret all queries from pvar(φ); finally it get a concrete
frame from [[φφi]]B and passes it to B; it answers as B. Hence, the advantage of A equals the
advantage of B, which is non-negligible. In addition, A runs in probabilistic polynomial-time
since B runs in probabilistic polynomial-time and the size of encoding of φ is constant in η.
This is a contradiction with φ1 ∼= φ2 being ≈-sound. Hence φφ1 ∼= φφ2 is also ≈-sound. ⊓⊔
(GE2) φ ∼= φ′ for any frame φ′ such that φ′ =E φ.
Proof. Obviously, using the =-soundness of =E . ⊓⊔
(GE3) τ(φ) ∼= φ for any renaming τ .
Proof. Using the fact that renamings do not change distributions, we get [[τ(φ)]] = [[φ]]. ⊓⊔
(GE4) If M,N are terms of the same sort such that N [M/z] =E y and y ∈ var(M) \ var(N),
then for any substitution σ such that r 6∈ (fn(σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) and x 6∈ dom(σ) it holds
νn˜.r.{σ, x =M [r/y])} ∼= νn˜.r.{σ, x = r}.
Proof. We prove that the statistical distance d([bs
r
← [[s]] : gˆ(bs)], [bs
r
← [[s]] : bs]) is negligible
for any computational functions gˆ : [[s]] → [[s]] and ĝ−1 : [[s]] → [[s]] such that Pr[bs
r
← [[s]] :
ĝ−1(gˆ(bs)) 6= bs] is negligible. Then, the correctness of rule (GE4) is easy to prove using the
=-soundness of =E and noticing that the context N can be used to build the inverse function
of λr.M(r).
Let us suppose that Pr[bs
r
← [[s]] : ĝ−1(gˆ(bs)) 6= bs] is negligible. To easy notations, we note
S = [[s]], S1 = {bs ∈ S|ĝ−1(gˆ(bs)) = bs}, S2 = {bs ∈ S|ĝ−1(gˆ(bs)) 6= bs}, s = |S|, si = |Si|. Our
hypothesis is equivalent to s2 = s ∗ η for some negligible function η. Also, it easy to see that
gˆ : S1 → gˆ(S1) is an injective function, and hence a bijective function too. So, if bs
′ ∈ gˆ(S1) we
know that there is exactly one element in S1 noted i(bs
′) such that gˆ(i(bs′)) = bs′. We note in
this case S1,bs′ = S1 \ {i(bs
′)}. Moreover, |S \ gˆ(S1)| = |S \ S1| = s2.
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d([bs
r
← [[s]] : gˆ(bs)], [bs
r
← [[s]] : bs])
=
∑
bs′∈S
∣∣Pr[bs r← [[s]] : gˆ(bs) = bs′]− 1
s
∣∣
=
∑
bs′∈S1
∣∣Pr[bs r← [[s]] : gˆ(bs) = bs′]− 1
s
∣∣+ ∑
bs′∈S2
∣∣Pr[bs r← [[s]] : gˆ(bs) = bs′]− 1
s
∣∣
≤
∑
bs′∈S1∩gˆ(S1)
∣∣Pr[bs r← [[s]] : gˆ(bs) = bs′]− 1
s
∣∣+ ∑
bs′∈S1∩(S\gˆ(S1))
∣∣Pr[bs r← [[s]] : gˆ(bs) = bs′]− 1
s
∣∣+ η
≤
∑
bs′∈S1∩gˆ(S1)
∣∣1
s
∗
∑
bs∈S
χ[gˆ(bs)=bs′] −
1
s
∣∣+ η + η
=
∑
bs′∈S1∩gˆ(S1)
1
s
∗
∣∣χ[gˆ(i(bs′)))=bs′] +
∑
bs∈S
1,bs′
χ[gˆ(bs)=bs′] +
∑
bs∈S2
χ[gˆ(bs)=bs′] − 1
∣∣+ 2 ∗ η
≤
∑
bs′∈S1∩gˆ(S1)
1
s
∗
∣∣1 + 0 + s2 − 1∣∣+ 2 ∗ η
= 3 ∗ η
⊓⊔
(HE1) If νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )] 6|= T and r 6∈ n(σ), then νn˜.σ ∼= νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )].
Proof. In the random oracle model, hash functions are drawn uniformly at random from the
space of functions of suitable type at the beginning of the interpretation of the frame. Thus,
the images that the hash function associates to different inputs are completely independent.
Therefore, one can delay the draw of each hash value until needed. We use σ[•] for σ[•/h(T )],
i.e. σ where all occurrences of h(T ) are replaced by •.
Now, using that νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )] 6|= T we get
[[νn˜.σ[h(T )/•]}]]A
=
[
H
r
← Ω;O = H; (φˆ[•], bs)
r
← [[(νn˜.σ[•], T )]]H,A : φˆ[H(bs)/•]
]
(since νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )] 6|= T one can delay the draw of h([[T ]]))
∼
[
H
r
← Ω;O = H; (φˆ[•], bs)
r
← [[(νn˜.σ[•], T )]]H,A; v
r
← [[s(T )]];
O = H[H → H[bs→ v]] : (φˆ[v/•])
]
(since νn˜.r.σ[r/h(T )] 6|= T the probability that A query h([[T ]]) is negligible)
∼
[
H
r
← Ω;O = H; (φˆ[•], bs)
r
← [[(νn˜.σ[•], T )]]H,A; v
r
← [[s(T )]] : (φˆ[v/•])
]
=
[
H
r
← Ω;O = H; φˆ[•]
r
← [[νn˜.σ[•]]]H,A; v
r
← [[s(T )]] : (φˆ[v/•])
]
= [[νn˜.νr.{σ[r/•]}]]A
⊓⊔
(SyE) If φ1 ∼= φ2 then φ2 ∼= φ1.
(TrE) If φ1 ∼= φ2 and φ2 ∼= φ3 then φ1 ∼= φ3.
Proof. Obviously, using that indistinguishability is an equivalence relation. ⊓⊔
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A.2 Proofs of Derived rules from Section 5
(XE1) If r 6∈ (fn(σ) ∪ fn(T )) then νn˜.r.{σ, x = r ⊕ T} ∼= νn˜.r.{σ, x = r}.
Proof. Consequence of rule (GE4) for M = y ⊕ T and N = z ⊕ T and equations (XEqi). ⊓⊔
(CD1) If (φ 6|= T1 ∨ φ 6|= T2) then φ 6|= T1||T2.
Proof. Consequence of rules (GD5) and (GD3) and equations (PEq1) and (PEq2). ⊓⊔
(HD1) If νn˜.σ 6|= T and h(T ) 6∈ st(νn˜.σ) then νn˜.{σ, x = h(T )} 6|= T .
Proof. Consequence of rules (HE1), (GD6) and (GD5). ⊓⊔
(XD1) If νn˜.σ 6|= T and r 6∈ (n˜ ∪ fn(T )) then νn˜.r.{σ, x = r ⊕ T} 6|= T .
Proof. Consequence of rules (GD5), (GD6), (HE1) and (SyE). ⊓⊔
(ODg1) If f is a one-way function and νn˜.{xk = pub(k), x = T} ∼= νr.{xk = pub(k), x = r},
then νn˜.{xk = pub(k), x = fk(T )} 6|= T .
Proof. Consequence of rules (OD1), (GE1) and (GD6). ⊓⊔
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